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ABSTRACT
Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free trade agreement
(FTA). Will an FTA between these countries be politically viable? And if so, what form will
it take? We address these questions using a political-economy framework that emphasizes the
interaction between industry special interest groups and an incumbent government. We describe
the economic conditions necessary for an FTA to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case
when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and when a few, politically sensitive sectors
can be excluded from the agreement.
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and NBER1. INTRODUCTION
Governments have been meeting frequently of late to discuss the possibility of
their forming bilateral or regional trading arrangements. The United States has
negotiated bilateral agreements with Israel and Canada, and is pursuing additional
accords with Mexico and perhaps Chile. The European Community expanded its
membership to include Greece, Portugal, and Spain, and has discussed preferential
arrangements with many Central and Eastern Europian countries. Some members of
the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have called for the formation ot
a Pacific free trade area. And Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay have banded
together to form the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).
These various discussions have never been easy, nor have they always been
successful. One need only reflect on the recent debates in the United States and Canada
over the NAFTA or those in Europe concerning accession to the EC or the lowering of
barriers to trade with Eastern Europe to recognize the political hackles raised by
prospective trading arrangements. Many political pressures are brought to bear on a
government as it contemplates whether to enter into an agreement and what the
provisions of such an agreement ought to be. In this paper we attempt to analyze some
of these political forces. In particular, we ask: Suppose that an opportunity arises for
two countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) among themselves. Will an
FTA between these countries be politically viable? And if so, what form will the
agreement take?
To address these questions, we use the framework of analysis that we developed in
Grossman and Helpman (1994). This framework emphasizes the interaction between
lobby groups representing industry special interests and an incumbent government. The
lobby groups offer policy-contingent campaign contributions to the politicians, who seek
to fulfill their own political objectives. In this setting, a country's policy stance reflects—2--
the relative political power of its various special interests and also the extent of its
government's concern for the plight of the average voter.
In Grossman and Helpman (1993) we studied international negotiations over levels
of non-discriminatory tariffs. We emphasized that international relations among
politically-minded governments involve two stages of strategic interaction.First, a
political competition in each country determines the government's policy preferences.
Then a give-and-take between governments determines the international equilibrium.
The politics leading up to a potential free trade agreement are similar in this regard, but
they differ from those that determine countries' tariff schedules in at least one
important respect. When individual tariff rates are set on many different goods, the
main political battles are between the export interests in one country and the import-
competing interests in the other country active in the same industry. The former group
lobbies for low tariffs in the importing country, while the latter group demands high
barriers to trade. In contrast, when an FTA will drop many or all (bilateral) tariff rates
to zero, the negotiations pit the export interests in a country directly against the
import-competing interests in the same country.The potential exporters covet
preferential access to the partner's market, while the import-competing industries aim to
preserve their protection by scuttling any agreement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the analytical framework,
describing both the economic and political interactions, and the effects of an FTA on the
welfare of various agents. In Section 3 we focus on a single country, asking when its
government might endorse an agreement calling for complete and immediate
liberalization of all bilateral trade with some partner. This forms the basis for our
discussion in Section 4 of the outcome of a bilateral negotiation between two countries.
There, we highlight the economic conditions necessary for an FTA covering all trade to
be viable as an equilibrium outcome. In Section 5 we allow for the possibility that an
FTA may exclude a few, especially sensitive sectors, or that it may at least allow for—3--.
some extended periods of adjustment. We show how a more liberal interpretation of
GATT rules about the types of permissible FTAs may enhance political viability and we
illustrate how the international bargaining process determines the terms of an
agreement. The conduding section summarizes our main findings.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
We examine the trade policy of two small countries, A and B, that interact with
one another and the rest of the world. The countries produce and trade many goods, all
of whose international prices are normalized to one. Initially, each country imposes the
same tariff on all imports of a good regardless of source, in keeping with the Most
Favored Nation (MFN) dause of the GATT Articles of Agreement. The two countries
now have the opportunity to negotiate an FTA together. Our aim is to identify the
political and economic conditions in the two countries that would make it possible for
their politicaily-minded governments to conclude such an agreement.
We suppose that there is a numeraire good 0 that is untaxed in each country and n
other goods. Some of these goods are imported by one or both of the small countries in
the initial equilibrium, while others may be exported. In keeping with GATT rules, we
exclude the possibility that the countries subsidize their exports. We also ignore export
taxes, which are unconstitutional in the United States and rarely used elsewhere. Thus,
we assume that the initial domestic price in either country of any good that is exported
by that country is one. As for import goods, these may be subject to arbitrary import
tariffs. We let rrepresentone plus the initial tariff rate on good i in country j.With
our normalization of international prices, these are also the domestic prices in country j
forthe import goods.'
'We adopt the convention that =1for the numeraire good 0 and for any goods that—4—
Article XXIV of the GATT Articles of Agreement permits certain exceptions to
the principle of MFN. Countries may eater bilateral or regional agreements if they
eliminate "duties and other regulations of coznmerceu on "substantially all trade" among
themselves. The GATT rules allow for both customsunions, inwhich member countries
impose a common external tariff on trade with the rest of the world, and free trade
areas, in which the countries maintain separate external tariffs and enforce them with
rules of origin. In this paper we study only the latter type of agreement. GATT rules
further stipulate that the external tariffs imposed after the conclusion of an PTA must
be no higher than those that were in force beforehand. Accordingly, we suppose that the
initial tariffscontinue to apply to imports from the rest of the world under any PTA
that might be contemplated.
The phrase "substantially all trade" in GATT Article XXIV has been interpreted
to allow some latitude in the structuring of trade agreements. Regional and bilateral
trade agreements typically exclude a few politically-sensitive sectors and specify a
prolonged phase-in period for some others. At first, we shall ignore this limited degree
of flexibility and interpret the GATT rules as requiring that all goods be freely traded
between the parties to any agreement. But later we will relax this assumption, and
suppose that the countries can exclude an exogenous (but presumably small) number of
sectors from the agreement. Then we will have the initial MFN tariffs remain in force
on trade between A and B in the excluded goods.
2.1 Objectives of Economic and Political Age nt
The qualitative features of the two small economies are similar, although the
particular conditions may differ. We describe the structure of one of the countries, but
are exported by country jinthe initial equilibrium. Then we can use =
torepresent the vector of initial domestic prices in country j.—5—
omit for the time being the country superscripts that implicitly are attached to every
function and variable.
The country has a population normalized to one. Individuals within the country
have identical preferences u(c) =c0+'_.1u(c), where c1 denotes consumption of
good i and u1(..) is an increasing and concave function. These preferences give rise to
the per capita demands D1(q1) for goods i =1,...,nand the demand y — qD1(q1)
for good 0, where q1 is the domestic consumer price of good i and y is the individual's
spending. The same demands apply in the aggregate, except that individual spending is
replaced by aggregate spending in the demand for good 0.
Good 0 is manufactured by labor alone, with one unit of labor required per unit of
output. Each other good is produced with constant returns to scale by labor and a
sector-specific factor. Since the domestic price of good 0 has been normalized to one, the
competitive wage rate must equal one in any equilibrium in which this good is produced.
Then the specific factor used in industry i earns the reward '1()wherep1 is the
domestic producer price and fl(.) >0.Aggregate supply of good i is X1(p1) =l1(p1)
for i =1,...,n, and net imports are M D(q1) —X(p),which may be positive or
negative.
We assume that the ownership of the specific factors is highly concentrated in the
population. In fact, we take an extreme case where these factor owners comprise a
negligible fraction of the total number of voters. The owners of a particular factor have
a common interest in seeing a high domestic price for the good they produce, and so
favor protection from foreign competition. We assume, perhaps because they are few in
number, that they can overcome the "coUective action problem" described by Olson
(1965) and that they work together for their common political goals. The owners of the
factor used in sector i form a special interest group that takes political action in order to—6—
maximize their joint welfare.2
As in Grossman and Helpman (1993,1994), we suppose that the incumbent
government is in a position to set trade policy, which means here that it can either work
toward a free trade agreement or terminate the discussions. The politicians may receive
contributions from the various interest groups hoping to influence its decision. The
politicians value these contributions —becausethey help them to get re-elected or for
other reasons —butthey also may care about the well being of the average voter. Per
capita welfare will enter the incumbent government's objective function, for example, if
some voters are well informed about the effects of trade policy and base their vote partly
on their standard of living. We assume that the government's objective has a simple
linear form, G EC + aW, where C1 is the campaign contribution of the lobby
representing industry i, W is aggregate (and per capita) welfare, and a is a parameter
(possibly zero) reflecting the government's sensitivity to the average voter's well being
relative to its taste for campaign contributions.3
Each individual in the economy enjoys surplus of S1(q)u[D(q1)] —qD(q)
from consuming good i, i =1,...,n. Each individual also receives a lump—sum transfer
from the government, representing his or her share of the tariff revenue, which we take
to be redistributed evenly to the entire population. Therefore, the aggregate welfare of
voters is given by
W =L+ rI(p1) + E' (r1— 1)M+ E' S(q1) , (2)
2 In Grossman and Helpman (1993,1994) we allow for the possibility that some industries
may fail to organize for political action, although we take the set of organized lobbies as
exogenous in our analysis. Here, for simplicity, we assume that all sectors are organized.
3 Alternatively, we could use the welfare of the median voter, rather than that of the
mean voter, as an argument in the government's objective function. The difference is
that the median individual owns none of any industry specific factor. The analysis
would proceed similarly, except that W would be defined in (2) to exclude aggregate
profits. See Grossman and Helpman (1994) for further discussion of the government's
objective function.—7—
whereL is the aggregate labor supply and the right-hand side of (2) therefore represents
the sum of aggregate labor income, aggregate profits, total tariff revenues, and aggregate
consumer surplus.
Note that the small number of owners of the input used in industry i capture a
negligible fraction of the total consumer surplus in the economy and they receive only a
negligible fraction of the rebated tariff revenue. Thus, the objective of these factor
owners can be approximated quite closely by l1(p1) —C,their profits net of political
contributions. We will use to represent their profits in the event that no agreement
is reached, in which case their output continues to sell for p r. Similarly, we let
denote the profits of industry i in the event of an FTA, which depend of course on the
equilibrium producer prices that would prevail under such an agreement. In a moment,
we will consider what these equilibrium prices must be; but first we describe the nature
of the political game.
2.2ThePolitical Game
Interest groups move first in the political game by offering financial support to the
incumbent politicians. The groups make their contributions contingent on the actions
taken by the government with respect to the trade agreement. This follows Grossman
and Helpman (1994), where we applied Bernheim and Whinston's (1986) notion of a
menu auction to the problem of tariff formation. In our earlier paper, we allowed
interest groups to design contribution schedules linking every trade tax vector that the
government might implement to a proposed campaign gift. Here the government has
only two options: to pursue an accord or not. It follows that a contribution schedule
need only comprise two numbers, CjF and CiN, which are the gifts associated with the
realization of an FTA and with a continuation of the status quo, respectively.
In fact, it is never optimal for a lobby to promise positive gifts for both policy—8—
outcomes, because then it could cut back equally on both of its offers without affecting
the government's decision. And a lobby surely does not wish to give the government
any added incentive to choose the outcome that is contrary to its interests. Thus, each
lobby needs to quote only a single number, representing its donation in the event that
its preferred outcome is chosen. We limit each lobby to offer no more than what it
stands to gain in profits if the government were to follow its bidding.4
The lobbies set their contributions noncooperatively. Then, faced with the set of
offers {(CIF,CiN)}, the government takes a position on the trade accord.The
government endorses the agreement if its political objective function is higher with the
FTA than without; that is, if EjCjF + aWF ￿ EjCiN + aWN (where WR is aggregate
welfare under regime R, R =F,N).Otherwise, it rejects the agreement.
2.3 Economic EqlLilibrium Under an FTA
Before we can proceed to characterize the outcome to this political game, we must
discuss what effects the FTA would have on the voters and special interest groups in
each country. Our economic analysis builds on Richardson (1992).
We focus on one particular product i. If both countries happen to export this good
in the initial equilibrium, then each has a domestic price equal to one, and the FTA will
have no effect on outputs, profits, or consumption levels. The more interesting cases
arise when at least one of the countries initially imports the good subject to a positive
MFN tariff. Without loss of generality we consider an industry where>￿1.
Figure 1 depicts the demand for imports by country A and three possible locations
of the total supply curve for country B. Suppose that B's endowment of the specific
factor is relatively small, as with X[1J, so that the total amount of that country's
4For every lobby, the strategy of bidding zero for all outcomes weakly dominates the
strategy of bidding in excess of what the lobby stands to gain under its preferred regime.
Our assumption rules out weakly dominated strategies.—9—
supply at pricedoes not suffice to satisfy A's import demand at that price. Then A
must continue to import from the rest of the world and its domestic price under an FTA
remains at r. The producers in B prefer to sell in A's market at the high price
rather than at the lower price T(whichmay equal one, if this is initially an export
good) prevailing at home. In this case, these producers divert all of their output to
country A after the conclusion of the FTA, and consumers in B satisfy all of their
demands by importing from the rest of the world. The FTA has no effect on producer or
consumer prices in country A, or on consumer prices in country B. It serves only to
raise the prices paid to producers in the low-tariff country, who in effect capture the
protection of the high-tariff country (see Krueger, 1993, on a related point), We will
refer to this as the case of enhanced protection.
At the opposite extreme, the endowment of the specific factor in B may be so large
that the industry output would satisfy A's import demand at the lower price r. In this
case, represented by X[3]inthe figure, the domestic price in country A falls to r.
Now B is the source for all of A's imports and producers in country B also supply at
least part of their home market. Consumers in B pay r for the good just as they did
before the agreement, and producers there continue to receive this sum. But producers
in A receive less than before, so this is a case of reduced protection.
Finally, the curve X[2J represents an intermediate case in which B's supply curve
intersects A's import demand at a price betweenand r. In this case, when
producers in B divert their output to the higher priced market, this output is just
sufficient to meet import demand at a price where there is no residual demand for
imports from the rest of the world. Producers in B receive the equilibrium price in A's
market, which is higher thanbut lower than r. Consumers in B import from the
rest of the world, paying the same priceas they did before the agreement.
The main point here is that, depending on the size of B's potential output, the
marginal good produced there may be sold in A's protected market, in B's less protected— 10—
market, or possibly even on the world market. The price that B's producers receive and
that all agents face in country A varies accordingly. Table 1 summarizes these findings.
2.4 Effects of an FTA on Economic Interests
We are now ready to describe how an FTA affects the profits of specific factor
owners and the welfare of the average voter in each country. We continue to focus on a
single industry in which> 1. Of course the effect of an agreement on aggregate
welfare reflects the sum of its effects in the various industries, including those in which
Tl3>T ￿
Consider first an industry that experiences enhanced protection. Producers in
country B benefit from their preferential access to A's highly protected market. We can
write their gain as =Ii(r)
—rI(r).Producers in A are unaffected, since the
domestic price there does not change. As for welfare, the only effect in A is the loss of
tariff revenue. This country, which collects duties on all of its imports in this industry
under the MFN tariff, does not collect any on its imports of X(r) from its partner
under the FTA. The welfare change in A amounts to =— (r—1)X(r).This
welfare loss corresponds, of course, to the adverse effects of trade diversion, which are
familiar from the literature on customs unions.
In country B the contribution of the industry under consideration to aggregate
welfare rises. There are two components of this gain. First, as we have noted, profits in
the industry increase. Second, the country now imports from the rest of the world to
replace the sales formerly made by domestic producers. Assuming that>1,the
country collects added tariff revenue on these new imports. The change in welfare
equals LW = + (r —1)X(r).We note that A's welfare loss exceeds B's
5Thatis, aggregate welfare can be written as W =L+ E1W, where W ll() + T. +
S(q) and T is the tariff revenue collected on imports of good i. Then the change in W
is the sum of the changes in the Wi's.—11 —
welfaregain, reflecting the global efficiency cost associated with trade diversion.6
For an industry that experiences reduced protection, the price obtained by
producers in the low-tariff country does not change. These producers gain nothing from
the agreement, while the producers in country A suffer from the increased import
competition. The expression for the profit change is £l1 =ll(r)
—fl(r)< 0.
Tariff revenue from the industry fails to zero in country A, as all imports now originate
in the partner country. But voters gain qua consumers from the fail in the domestic
price of the good. The contribution of the industry to the change in aggregate welfare is
= — (r—1)M(r)+ S(r) —S(r),which may be positive or
negative depending on the relative sizes of the gains from trade creation and the losses
from trade diversion. Country B captures only the extra tariff revenue in this case
=(r
—1)M(r)],but joint welfare gains for the two countries together are
assured.7
The intermediate case combines elements of the other two. Producers gain in
country B and lose in country A. Aggregate welfare rises in B and may rise or fall inA.
The effect on joint welfare of the two countries is ambiguous. As there is nothing new in
this case, we will not consider it any further.
To summarize, an FTA can have any of several combinations of impacts on the
economic actors with interests in a particular industry. Producers in the country that
6Sincethe profit functions are convex and their derivatives give the supplies, we know
that H(r) —II(r)
< —X(r)(r
—r).Then the fact that> implies
+ <(r —1)[X(r)
—X(r)}<0.
The convexity of the profit and consumer surplus functions implies Efl >
X(r)(r —r)and S'(r) —S'(r)>
—D(r)(r
—r')in view of the fact
that the derivatives of these functions are the supply and minus the demand function,
respectively. These inequalities in turn imply + LW> (r —1)[M(r)
—
M'(r)J> 0, where the latter inequality follows from the fact that< r.— 12—
exportsto its partner under an FTA sometimes gain and never lose. These producers
are one potential source of political support for an agreement. On the other hand, the
producers in the country that imports from its partner under the agreement never gain
and sometimes lose. Here we find potential resistance. The stake of the general public
in an FTA is less clearcut. If most goods will be exported to the partner, than aggregate
welfare must rise, as consumer surplus never falls in the exporting country and tariff
revenues generally increase. If most goods will be imported, the aggregate welfare effect
depends on the relative strength of the forces of trade creation and trade diversion, as is
well known from the theory of discriminatory tariffs.
3. UNILATERAL STANCES
The structuring of a free trade agreement typically involves lengthy negotiations
between prospective partners. The negotiating parties often haggle over the length of
the adjustment periods for sensitive sectors and perhaps a list of goods that will be
excluded from the agreement altogether. We will take up some of these bargaining
issues in Section 5.But first we consider a simpler case where the terms of the
prospective FTA are fixed.Here the countries must agree to an across-the-board
liberalization of their bilateral trade, or there is no agreement at all.
We begin by examining the political interactions in a single country. These
determine the nation's tnilateroJ stance; that is, the position the government would
adopt if it expected that its decision would determine the fate of the agreement. We
wish to describe the positions that can be supported as optimal government responses to
equilibrium behavior by the country's interests groups. To this end, we propose the
following definition:— 13—
DefiiitionAchoice of regime RE{N,F} is a isnilateral stance if there exists a set of
political contributions {CjN,CjF} ,onefor each lobby i, such that:
(a)CiK >0for K=N,F and for all i;
(b)C1K ￿ max (0, 11iK —HjJ)for J =N,F;K =N,F;J K;
(c)EjCjR + aWR ￿ EjC1K + aWK for K=N,F;
(d)for every lobby i there exist no contributions CiN ￿ 0 and CiF ￿ 0
and no regime R1E{N,F} such that:
(j)ji C +aW￿ Cj + Ci + aWK for K=N,F; and
(ii) fl —> iR
—
CjR.
The definition stipulates that the political contributions supporting a unilateral stance
must be non-negative and no greater for any lobby than what it stands to gain under its
preferred regime. The contributions must induce the government to take the position R
rather than the alternative, in the light of its own political objectives. Moreover, there
should be no alternative offers available to any lobby that, given the contribution
schedules of the other lobbies and the anticipated optimization by the politicians, would
leave the lobby with higher net welfare.
We will find that there are two generic types of unilateral stances that may exist
for a given set of parameter values. We refer to a stance as 1Lnpre33.Lred if the
government takes the position despite there being no offers ofcontributions that
encourage it to do so. By contrast, a pressured stance is onethat the government takes
partly in response to offers of support. We establish that— 14—
Resid1: There exists an unpressured stance in support of regime R if and only if
a(WR —WE,)max [0, max (ll —[IjR)] (3)
where E.isthe alternative to regime R.
This result says that, in an unpressured stance, the government must prefer the regime
R to the alternative R on grounds of aggregative welfare. Moreover, there should be no
single lobby i favoring the alternative E.thatstands to lose so much under R that it
could unilaterally sway the government from its concern for the public interest.
The proof is straightforward. First, suppose that all contribution offers are zero;
i.e., CjR =C=0for all i. Then the government will choose the socially preferred
position and, if (3) is satisfied, no single lobby will find it profitable given the zerooffers
of the others to induce the government to change its stance. This establishes that (3) is
sufficient for an unpressured stance in favor of R. As for necessity, it is obvious that we
must have WR— W1, ￿ 0 if the government is to choose R in the absence of any
contributions in support of that position. And if a(WR —WE,) <— fl,for any i,
then lobby i could profitably deviate by bidding something more than a(WR —WE,) but
less than —
11iB.'thereby inducing the government to choose B..
If the average voter is indifferent to the FTA, or close to it, then no unpressured
stance will exist. For then, whatever stance the government might contemplate taking
on behalf of voters can be blocked by a single lobby on the opposing side. Clearlythere
can exist at most one unpressured stance, since only one regime is the socially preferred
outcome.
Next we examine unilateral stances that feature active lobbying on behalf of the
chosen regime R. With CiR >0for at least one lobby i, the government must be left— 15—
indifferent between the alternative regimes; i.e., E CjR + aWR =EC+aW.
Otherwise, one of the lobbies offering a positive contribution in support of R could
reduce its offer without affecting the final outcome, thereby increasing its net profit.
But once we know that the government is left indifferent, we also know that every lobby
on the losing side (i.e., those preferring .toR) must be bidding forthe full amount of
what it stands to lose under R; otherwise one such lobby would find it profitable to raise
its offer for f.slightly,thereby tipping the balance to that policy. Of course, no lobby
on the winning side offers more than the extra profits it earns under R. Since each
lobby contributes nothing if the government's choice is counter to its interests, we have
established
ResultIf there exists a pressured stance in support of regime R, then
+ aWR ￿fl + aWfl,. (4)
Condition (4) states that the regime supported in a pressured stance maximizes
the sum of aggregate profits and a times average welfare. It follows that, if such a
stance exists, the policy outcome it selects is (generically) unique. Existence requires
aWR <aW+•-(iiR'
1ER
where S is the set of lobbies that prefers regime f,andR is the regime that satisfies
(4). In other words, a pressured stance exists whenever positive contributions onbehalf
of regime R are needed to induce the government to choose this outcome, when all of the
opponents of R bid their maximum willingness to pay for thealternative. When this
inequality fails, the proponents of the regime R that satisfies (4)will refrain from—16—
offering any contributions and the government will choose R nonetheless.
It is possible that both a pressured and an unpressuied stance will exist for some
parameter values. In the event, the two stances may select the same policy outcome.
But this need not be the case. Whereas the unpressured stance always endorses the
socially preferred regime, the pressured stance may select the regime that harms the
average voter. This happens anytime the aggregate profit gain from R relative toft
exceeds a times the social welfare loss.
In cases where pressured and unpressured stances both exist and support different
policy positions, there may be compelling reasons to focus primarily on the pressured
stance.In these circumstances, the unpressured stance does not survive as an
equilibrium when we allow a lirmted degree of communication and coordination among
the lobbies. In particular, we can introduce the notion of a coalition-proof eqiilibrium,
as discussed by Bernheim et a!. (1987). Under this refinement of the equilibrium
concept, a Nash equilibrium is rejected if there exists a set of actions for some coalition
of players that would increase (or not decrease) the payoff to each member of the
coalition given the actions of non-members and that would not require any monitoring,
because each proposed action constitutes a best response to the proposed or given
actions of all others. The idea is that a member of such a coalition might be able to
communicate with prospective partners so as to suggest the alternative plays and to
point out that all would benefit under these plays. Seeing the entire list of proposed
plays by coalition members, each would realize that there is no incentive for any to
cheat, assuming that the others do as proposed.
The unpressured stance fails this test anytime it selects a regime different from the
pressured stance. For suppose that (3) is satisfied for R and (4) is satisfied for ft. In
the unpressured stance, all supporters of R contribute nothing. An industry that is
harmed by R could propose a coalition comprising all such industries. It could propose
that the members each contribute just enough so that the total contributions overcome— 17—
thegovernment's sensitivity to voter opposition. No member would be asked to
contribute more than what it has to gain. Then, given the zero contributions of the non-
members of this coalition, the government would be induced to choose R. Each member
of the coalition would benefit. And each would see itself as pivotal and so would have
no incentive to deviate, given the proposed actions of the others.Since we have
assumed that (4) is satisfied for .,thecollective gains of the members of the coalition
are large enough to allow for the design of such a proposal. Evidently, the unpressured
stance rests on the inability of opponents of the chosen regime to coordinate their
political activity even to a rmnimal extent.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) prove that all coalition-proof equilibria in menu
auctions select an action from among the set of actions that maximizes the joint welfare
of the principals and the agent, and also that any element in this set can be supported as
a coalition-proof equilibrium. Here, the government acts as agent for the many interest
groups and condition (4) expresses the requirement for joint welfaremaximization.8
Since the regime that maximizes joint welfare always exists, we have proven
Result .g. A coalition-proof stance always exists. This stance supports regime R. if and
only if (4) is satisfied.
Results 2 and 3 imply immediately that all pressured stances are coalition proof
This completes our discussion of the equilibrium political interactions in a single
8Bernheixnand Whinston (1986) also show that any action taken in a coalition-proof
equilibrium can be supported by trt&th f-ui strategies and that every equilibnumwith
truthful strategies is coalition proof. In our context, truthful strategies are those in
which each lobby bids nothing for its less preferred regime, a lobby on the losing side
offers forthe full amount that it stands to lose from R, and a lobby on the winning
side pays for R at most what it stands to gain relative to— 18—
country.To summarize, there always exists at least one unilateral stance. This stance
may be pressured or unpressured. When a pressured stance exists,it always supports
the (generically) unique regime that maximizes the joint welfare of lobbies and
politicians. When an unpressured stance exists, it supports the regime favored by
voters. When both exist, they may or may not endorse the same outcome. If they do
not, then only the pressured stance will be coalition proof. In these situations, itwill be
possible for a coalition of lobbies to upset the unpressured stance by minimal
coordination of their political acitivies.
4.EQUUIBRJUMAGREEMENTS
We turn now to the international negotiation. Our prohibition on exdusions
leaves the two governments with little to negotiate about. In principle, they could
discuss compensation payments that would be made from one treasury to the other
under the terms of a potential agreements. Such compensation schemes do play a part
in some regional trade agreements, such as in the European Community. But transfers
still seem the exception rather than the rule (for example, they are not included in the
terms of the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement), and even where they are
used, they often are limited in scope. While we could include (limited or full)
opportunities for compensation in our analysis of FTA's, to avoid a taxonomy we choose
to focus on the case where no such opportunities are available.
In the event, an FTA without exemptions requires the unilateral support of both
governments. If the lobbies in one country anticipate that the other governmentwill
seek an agreement, they will expect that their own country's political deliberations will
determine the fate of the FTA. Then they will act exactly as described in our analysis—19--
of unilateral stances in section 3•9Ina sub—game perfect Nash equilibrium, all
expectations about the behavior of the other government are fulfilled. This justifies the
following definition:
Definition: An FTA is an equilibrium agreement if and only if R =Fis a unilateral
stance in both countries.
Our objective in this section is to characterize the economic and political conditions in
the two countries under which an FTA can arise as an equilibrium outcome.
A main theme in our discussion will be the following: The political viability of an
FTA typically requires sufficient "balancet' in the potential trade between the parties to
the agreement. To motivate the analysis in this section, it helps to begin with an
extreme case. Suppose that all goods exported by country A in the status quo ante are
also exports of country B and that country A has the higher MFN tariff in all -of its
import-competing sectors. Then country A would not export to country B at all in the
event of an agreement. This means that none of the lobbies in A would support the
agreement. If most industries would experience enhanced protection, thenwelfare in A
would be likely to fail, in which case there could be no unilateral stance in A in support
of the FTA. On the other hand, if most industries would experience reduced protection,
then the potential opposition to the agreement from the special interests would be great.
The only chance for the agreement in this case of extreme imbalance in potential trade
would be if the agreement happened to be welfare improving and the opposing interests
failed to coordinate their lobbying activities or if they were unable to muster enough
If the Nash equilibrium entails a continuation of the status quo, then lobbies in at least
one country must expect that the other will oppose the agreement atthe international
negotiation. These lobbies will contribute nothing to block the agreement,because they
will believe its fate to be doomed in any case. This means that a pressured stance
against an FTA will be observed in an international equilibriumin at most one country.—20—
OppO8itiOfl to block the accord. And even this last scenario would be unlikely, if the
initial MFN tariffs also were the outgrowth of a political process.'°
In order to be more precise about what we mean by balance and also to see how
industry conditions influence the political outcome, we turn to a special (but less
extreme) case with particular functional forms. We suppose now that the households in
both countries share identical utility functions wherein all of the non-numeraire goods
enter symmetrically and each u1(.) is quadratic. Then aggregate demand for any good i
in country jhasthe linear form
D(qf)=D—bqfori= l,2,...,n and j=A,B. (5)
Also, aggregate world supply of each of these goods is the same and the supply in each
country is inelastic. Moreover, we assume that X =OXand X =(1—O)Xin a
fraction 3ofthe industries, while X =(l—O)Xand X1 =OXin the remaining
fraction 1—s of the industries. In other words, all industries are mirror images, with
country A having the larger supply in some industries and country B the larger supply
in the others. Without further loss of generality we can take 0>1/2 and s ￿ 1/2.
Then s measures the extent of imbalance in the number of potential export industries,
whereas 0measuresthe imbalance in output in any one sector.
The viability of an FTA also depends, of course, on the structure of the initial
MFN tariffs. So far we have taken these as arbitrary. But it is reasonable to suppose
that they too were an equilibrium outcome to a prior political battle. For the purposes
of our illustrative example, we now assume that the MFN tariffs initially protecting the
10Wewill see below that if the MFN tariffs are the result of a political process similar to
the one assumed to precede the negotiation of the FTA, then the joint welfare of the
government and the lobby must fall in any import-competing industry where a tariff
rate is lowered. This means that no pressured stance could support an FTA if all
industries were import competing and all experienced reduced protection under the
FTA.—21 —
import-competingindustries in each country are those that would result from a lobbying
game similar to the one described here, as derived in our 1994 paper. Assuming that
both sets of politicians place the same weight a on aggregate welfare in their objective
functions, application of Proposition 1 in Grossman and Helpman (1994) gives
=1+-aforj=A,B, (6)
and for all sectors i that have positive imports in the initial equilibrium.
In this example, different types of outcomes emerge depending on the configuration
of parameter values. We will examine three different sets of parameter restrictions.
While these possibilities do not exhaust the entire parameter space, they do illustrate all
of the different considerations that may come into play. We begin with
Restriction 1: (D—b)/X > 1 + 0/a.
With this restriction on the parameters, all of the non-numeraire goods are
imported in both countries in the initial equilibrium, when the MFN tariffs given in (6)
apply. Country A has the higher import tariff in the fraction s of industries where its
supply is OX, while country B has the higher tariff in the remaining fraction 1—s of
industries. This is because the political processes are similar in the two countries, and
the special interests in each country are willing to contribute more in their initial bids
for MFN protection when they have more output at stake.
Under an FTA, each country would import from its partners all of those goods on
which its MFN tariff is higher. This means that A would import a fraction s of the non-
numeraire goods from B, and B would import the remaining fraction 1—s of these goods
from A. Moreover, under Restriction 1, the output in the low-tariff country would not—22 —
sufficeto satisfy import demandin the high-tariffcountry at the latter country's pre-
agreement domestic price. Therefore, recalling Table 1,all industries would experience
enhanced protection under the proposed FTA .Itis straightforward to calculate the
contribution of sector i to the change in aggregate welfare in each country using the
formulas from Section 2.4. We find
—0(1abir x =ox
= , forj= A,B. (7)
1
0(1 abif X =(1—0)X
Notice that what one country gains in aggregate welfare, the other loses."
We can also calculate the profit changes that would result from the FTA. With
all industries experiencing enhanced protection, the various import-competing interests
in the high-tariff sectors do not suffer any profit loss. On the other hand, the factor
owners in industries that would export under the agreement all gain.We have
o ifX=0X
=
2 ,forj= A,B. (8) I
(20—1)(1—0)Xif X =(1—0)X
We are now ready to examine the unilateral stances. From (7) we see that an
unpressured stance can favor an FTA in country A only if S =1/2;i.e., if the number of
potential export industries is exactly the same in each country. If 8 =1/2,the FTA is
welfare neutral, and the government in A could (marginally) support an agreement
t Joint social welfare in the two countries does not change, because outputs are fixedin
each country and consumer prices do not change, so neither do demands.With a fixed
allocation of resources in each country, only the distribution of the industry surplus can
be affected by the FTA.—23—
without any lobbying on its behalf. But if s >1/2,the welfare loss from the fraction s
of high-tariff industries in country A would exceed the welfare gain from the fraction 1—s
of low-tariff industries. Some political activity on the part of the beneficiaries would be
necessary for the FTA to materialize.
What about the pressured stances? Using (7) and (8) we find that condition (4)
indicates pressured support for an agreement in country B for all s ￿ 1/2, and that the
government of country A will be induced to favor the accord if and onlyif
1
0 —1/2 s<+ <1. (9)
20 —1+ 2a0
The inequality in (9) will be satisfied for s sufficiently close to one half. Then the
potential profit gains to the owners of the fraction 1—3 of the specific factorswill be
sufficiently large in the aggregate to outweigh the cost to the average voter.On the
other hand, if s is close to one, then the contributions by supporters of the agreement
will not be sufficient to sway the government in the light of the prospective harm to the
general public. For a given value of 3,apressured stance in A is more likely to support
the FTA the smaller is the weight a that the government attaches to aggregate
welfare, since welfare in A surely falls under the agreement. Finally, the political
viability of a potential agreement increases with the extent of supplyimbalance in a
representative industry, because the potential profit gains for exporters grow more
rapidly with 0 than do the social welfare losses in the import sectors.
Our next parameter restriction is
Restriction1 + (1—0)/a >(D—b)/X>0+ 0/a.
When this restriction holds, all non-numeraire goods again are imported byboth—24--
countries in the pie-agreement equilibrium. But now, using the tariff formula (6), we
find that the supply of output in the low-tariff country in each industry is enough to
satisfy all demand by the other country at the low-tariff country's price. This means
that all industries would experience reduced protection under the agreement.
Again we can calculate the contribution of sector i to the change in aggregate
welfare in each country. This will depend upon whether i is a high-tariff or low-tariff
sector. In the case of a high-tariff sector we find
=X2[(.i)[Db9] + L(292—20+l)] 0 forX= OX. (10)
The ambiguity here reflects the offetting effects of trade creation and trade diversion.
Meanwhile, the low-tariff sectors in each country become exporters under the agreement,




—b— 1 ] > 0for X =(1—0)X. (11)
Country A has a fraction s of high-tariff sectors and a fraction 1—s of low-tariff
sectors. Using the expressions in (10) and (11) we find that aggregate welfare may rise
or fall under an FTA. If the potential export industries are evenly divided (s =1/2),
then aggregate welfare must rise. Then an unpressured stance favors an FTA in both
countries as long as the total number of specific factors exceeds four.'3 On the other
13Byrestriction 2, (D —b)/X>0+ 0/a. Then, since 0> 1/2, the expression in square
brackets in (11) must be positive.
13 When s =1/2,a times the aggregate welfare gain in each country equals
n(20—1)X2/4ab. Then using the formula for the profit loss of highly-protected producers
(see (12) below), we find that condition (3) for an unpressured stancein favor of F is—25—
hand, if s= 1,aggregate welfare must rise in country B, but rises in A only if the
expression in (10) is positive. Then even if the special interests that will be hurt by the
FTA fail to coalesce into a (non-cooperative) coalition, the outcome of the negotiation
remains in doubt.
In this case of reduced protection, the most politically powerful producers in each
country (i.e., those that succeeded in securing high barriers in theinitial political
equilibrium) would be harmed by an agreement. And the other producers would not
gain. The profit changes are given by
2




Suppose that the industries are evenly divided between the countries (s =1/2).In this
case the aggregate profit loss in the n/2 high-tariff industries must exceed atimes the
aggregate welfare gain. So the pressured stance in each country rejectsthe FTA. As s
increases,industry opposition to the agreement eases in country B, but intensifiesin
country A. Moreover, as the number of import sectors in A risesabove one half, the
added pressure from industry to block the agreement outweighs anyincreased
willingness on the part of the government to cater to the averagevoter.14 It follows that
satisfied if and only if n 49. But since 9 < 1, this must be satisfied for all n > 4.
14 That is, suppose we shift one sector from the list of potential exporters to that of
potential importers. The welfare benefit of the FTA may rise orfall. But in any case,
the political support for the agreement as measured byrrk+ aAW' must decline.
We calculate using (10), (11), and (12) that
d(A[IA+ aWA)/ds =
— — I +(i_9)[ 2a (P— 0)—1+ 0]]
Thismust be negative for parameters that obey restriction 2. Thus,if (4) is satisfied for— 26—
thepressured stance in A rejects the FTA not only when s1/2, but for all values of
S E [1/2, 1]. The international outcome must be acontinuation of the status quo if the
special interests in A induce a coalition-proof stance.
The final parameter restriction that we consider is
Restriction 3 0 > (D—b)/X > (1—O)(1 + 1/a)
In this case the producers in each country with output OX exporttheir product in the
initial equilibrium.Since we rule out export subsidies, they receive only the
international price for their goods.Meanwhile, the producers with output (1—O)X
cannot satisfy domestic demand at the tariff-inclusive domestic price,when the tariff is
given by (6). These sectors are protected in theinitial equilibrium. But it can be shown
that all industries experience reduced protection under the FTA, sothat international
prices then would prevail in all sectors.
The export sectors again gain nothing from an FTA. But this time,these sectors
also contribute nothing to the change in aggregate welfare, as notariff revenue is
collected on the imports that replace diverted sales. The factor ownersin import-
competing sectors sacrifice profits under an agreement, whilethe contribution of these
sectors to aggregate welfare expands. We must as usual evaluatethe sum of rxnf and
but now the sum need only be taken over the import-competingindustries in
country j.Ineach such industry tariff revenue falls due to trade diversion,and a
politically-motivated tariff is removed. Since the MFN tariffs in (6) werethemselves set
to maximize a political objective function, their elimination mustreduce the joint
welfare of the lobby and the government.'5 It follows that the pressured stance rejects
R =Nwhen s =1/2,it must also be satisfied for R =Nwhen s> 1/2.
'Itis possible, of course, to calculate + aAW for a typical import-competing—27—
theagreement in both countries.
Let us summarize what we have learned from this example. First, an FTA is more
likely to be supportable as an equilibrium outcome when s is close to one half. This is
the sense in which potential trade between the countries must be balanced: There must
be a sufficient number of potential exporters in each country who will lobby for the
agreement, or a sufficient number of sectors with assured welfare gains to offset the
potential losses from trade diversion. A second and more pessimistic conclusion may be
warranted. Recall that an PTA can emerge as a coalition-proof equilibrium outcome for
some parameters satisfying restriction 1, but not for any that satisfy restriction 2 r 3.
In the first of these cases, all industries experience enhanced protection. Then the
export industries are willing to contribute heavily in support of the agreement. In the
second and third cases, reduced protection prevails, and then import-competing
industries are most vehement (and forthcoming) in their opposition. But enhanced
protection generally means joint welfare losses for the two countries, while reduced
protection generates joint welfare gains. So, an PTA is most likely to be politically viable
exactly when it would be socially harrnM.'8
sector. The expression for is the same as that given in the top line of (12), while
the expression for AW is the same as that given in (10). Then we can verify that Lfl
+ aW <0for all parameters that obey restriction 3.
18Rirschman(1981) made a similar point in his prescient discussion of the dynamics of
the European Community. In our model the association between social inefficiency and
political viability is stark, because exporters can gain from an agreement only when
domestic prices in the partner country rise. This need not be the case in more general
models. For example, if products were differentiated by country of origin, the exporters
of a good could gain even as tariff-inclusive prices fell in the importing market. The
same would be true if high transport costs segmented countries A and B from the rest of
the world prior to any agreement. But there is one point here that is quite general.
When discriminatory tariffs give rise to trade diversion, the gains to exporters in one
country come at the expense of the general taxpayer in the other. To the extent that
industry interests are better represented in the political process than taxpayer interests,
trade divergence will enhance political viability while reducing total welfare.28 —
5.INDUSTRY EXCLUSIONS
Governments that are considering a free trade agreement have some ability to
make a pact palatable to opposing interests, or at least to m.itigate their opposition.
They can do so by providing long periods of adjustment to some sectors and by
excluding others from the agreement entirely. However, the governments inevitably
must clash on the issue of exceptions, because each seeks to preserve protection for some
of its politically powerful industries, while trying to gain market access for all of its
potential exporters. An equilibrium agreement is one that reflects the political pressures
on each government and also the give and take of the bargaining process.
In this section, we examine how industry exclusions might make an FTA
politically viable that otherwise would not be. We also investigate the determinants of
the identity and number of excluded sectors. We use "exclusions" here to represent not
only the granting of permanent exemptions from an agreement, but also as a metaphor
for long phase-ia periods. The number of such exclusions should not be so large as to
violate the GATT stipulation that an PTA must liberalize "substantially all trade."
5.1UnilateralStances
We begin as before by focusing on the political interactions in a single country.
We investigate what type of agreement (if any) a government would choose in response
to domestic political pressures, assuming that it could dictate the termsof the
agreement to its potential partner. Of course, an equilibrium agreementneed not look
anything like the tnilateraJ stance; but it helps to understand the political processin one
country before turning to the two-country bargaining problem.
The lobbies' contribution schedules now must reflect the various positions that its
government might take. A government can choose to reject an agreemententirely, it—29—
can pursue an agreement calling for the exclusion of certain sectors, or it can seek an
agreement with completely free bilateral trade. In principle, the lobbies might link their
contributions to the identities of all entries on the list of excluded sectors. However, in
our economy, the owners of a specific factor care only about the fate of their own
industry. An industry facing the prospect of increased competition from partner imports
will prefer that its protection be preserved for as long as possible (here, indefinitely),
while an industry that hopes to find a new or expanded export market in the partner
country will not want to see its products among those excluded from the agreement. We
can assume, therefore, without loss of generality that the special interests distinguish
their contribution offers only among outcomes that affect their profits. Each lobby i
specifiesexactly three numbers, denoted CiN, CiE, and C1, that represent its campaign
gift in the event that the government rejects the FTA, in the event that it concludes an
FTA but with industry i excluded from the agreement, and in the event that it
concludes an FTA with industry i included in the agreement, respectively. 1TExcluded
sectors retain their MFN tariffs once any FTA is enacted.
We can define a unilateral stance in much the same way as we did in Section 3.
In particular, the unilateral stance supports some regime; either the government rejects
the agreement entirely (ft =N),or it opts for an agreement (ft =F)with a particular
set of excluded sectors. In the latter case, the number of excluded sectors may be zero
and must not exceed the exogenous limit ethatwe use to represent the constraints
imposed by the GATT. In an equilibrium stance, the government achieves greater
political welfare G than it could under any alternative regime satisfying GATT rules.
And no lobby is able to redesign its offer triplet, given the offers of the other lobbies and
17Ina world with differentiated products and two-way trade, we would need to allow for
the possibility that an agreement removes one country's barrier to imports of good i, but
not the other's. Here, trade in any one good is unidirectional, with imports going from
the low-tariff to the high-tariff country. In this context, an industry exclusion means
that the high-tariff country retains its barrier to imports from its FTA partner.—30 —
theanticipated optimization by the politicians, in such a way as to increase its profits
net of contributions.
In describing the unilateral stances that can emerge as equilibrium government
responses to political pressures, it will prove convenient to refer to the politically optimal
set of ezclusions, E(e). We define this set as follows:
Definition: The set of politically optimal ezelusioris E(e) is the largest set of sectors such
that (i) E(e)implies AIl + aAW1 ￿ miii [miii (ALl .+aAW.),0]; and
jE(e)
(ii) #E(e) <e..
The first part of the definition states that, for any industry in the set E(e), the joint
gain to the government and the factor owners from liberalizing bilateral trade in good i
must be non-positive and in fact more negative than for any sector among those not in
the set E(e). The second part of the definition says that the number of elements of the
set E(e) —denoted#E(e) —shouldnot exceed the exogenous limit on the number of
allowable exclusions.
Our first result concerns coalition-proof stances. It says




+ aWIF) +aW1) . (13)
In this stance, the sectors i EE(e)are excluded from the agreement.
The left-hand side of (13) gives the joint welfare of all lobbies and the government under
an FTA with excluded sectors E(e), while the right-hand side gives the joint welfareof—31 —
theseparties in the status quo. The result follows from Theorem 3 of Bernheirnand
Whinston (1986), which states that every coalition-proof equilibrium in a menu auction
selects an action from among those that maximize the joint welfare of the principals and
the agent.'8 In the coalition-proof unilateral stance, the constraint on the number of
exclusions binds if and only if there are at least e industries that would lose more in
profits by being included in the agreement than a times what the average voter would
gain from having them included. The excluded industries are thosethat are most
politically sensitive, in the sense that their inclusion imposes the greatest cost to specific
factor owners and politicians taken together.
The coalition-proof stance can be supported by "truthful offerstt in which each
lobby bids the same amount for an exclusion as for an outright rejectionof the
agreement (CjE =CjN￿ 0 for all 1), an industries j 0 E(e) bid for an exclusion exactly
what they stand to lose (if anything) by being included in the agreement, and all
industries i E E(e) bid for an exclusion at most what they stand to save by having their
trade barriers preserved, and exactly what is needed to ensure that they are among those
excluded. This stance may be pressured, in the sense that at least some of the industries
that stand to gain from the FTA contribute actively on its behalf (i.e., C11 >0for some
1).The joint contributions of these (export) industries then are just sufficient to
overcome the political resistance to the agreement.
Inequality (13) may hold even when inequality (4) fails for R =F.That is, the
coalition-proof stance may endorse an FTA with exclusions in cases where it would
reject the agreement in the absence of exclusions. The exclusions allow the government
to avoid the biggest political costs associated with an FTA, and the net political gain
may be positive once these particularly exposed sectors aresheltered from the
18Notethat E(e) maximizes + aWN) + -(1F + aWF) among all sets E
iEE jOE
that have #E e.—32 —
agreement.
When inequality (13) does fail, a coalition of industries can block any stance in
support of an FTA by promising sufficient contributions in the event that the status quo
is preserved.Moreover, the contributions that block a proposed FTA require no
monitoring (they are best responses) and leave each coalition member at least as well off
as under the agreement. However, as before, the interests that oppose the FTA may fail
to achieve the required degree of coordination, if their opportunities for communication
are limited or if there are very many of them. In the event, the politics may give rise to
a unilateral stance in support of an FTA, even though the interests that stand to benefit
from the agreement contribute nothing to further its cause. We will refer to such a
stance with all C1 =0as isnpresstred. The next result gives the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of such a stance.'
RestU 5: There exists an unpressured stance with R =Fif and only if
B aW.N + B aWF + C ￿ B aW.N + max [0, max (N— 1F1 (14)
iEE(e)
1iE(e) iE(e)
for a particula.r, non-negative CB (IIjN—IljF). In this stance, the sectors i E E(e)
iEE(e)
are excluded from the agreement.
The appendix provides a proof of this result and also gives the exact expression for
the constant C. Intuitively, C represents the total amount of contributions by lobbies
that are excluded from the agreement, when each such lobby gives the minimum amount
that ensures it a place on the list of exclusions (given the equilibrium bids of the other
t9is unpressured in the sense that the government's decision to pursue the agreement
elicits no contributions from beneficiaries. The government may, however, collect
contributions from some or all of the industries that are granted exclusions.—33 —
lobbies).No lobby would contribute more than its prospective profit loss in order to
secure an exclusion, which explains the upper bound on C. And some industries may
need to contribute less than the total amount of the profits they stand to lose, if for
example, the inclusion of these industries would contribute to a decline in voter welfare
and so the government would wish to exclude them even without any pressure. In view
of this interpretation of C, Result 5 is quite analogous to Result 1. The stance in favor
of F can exist because the opponents of the agreement may contribute little or nothing
toward their common cause. Then it may be that no single lobby among those not
excluded from the agreement has enough at stake to warrant its acting unilaterally to
reverse the stance.
From Results 4 and 5 we see that all unilateral stances in support of an FTA share
the same set of (politically optimal) exclusions. It is easy to see why. Suppose, to the
contrary, that there were a unilateral stance in which some sector i€E(e) were not
exempted and that perhaps some jE(e) were excluded in its place. First, if there were
no such j,theni would be willing to bid up to 11iN —11iFin order to secure an
exclusion. The government would add i to the exclusion list if the contribution were
large enough to compensate for the political cost, a(WF —WiN).But according to the
definition of E(e), we must have jN —11iFa(WF —ViN),because rI+ aiV0.
Second, if there were some jinthe place of i on the list of exemptions, that industry
would have bid at most rUN— jFfor its place on the list. Again, the definition of E(e)
ensures that I could bid something less than its potential profit gain but enough to
induce the government to exclude I rather than j. The competition among lobbies for
places on the exclusion list ensures that this list will be "politically efficient" from the
point of view of the special interests and the politicians. The only time that unexploited
gains may remain for these groups is when the adversely affected industries fail to
coordinate their political actions so as to block entirely an FTA that is not in their
collective interest.—34-—
5.2 Ezclu.siorzi that Save an FTA
In this section we illustrate by means of an example that the ability to grant
industry exclusions can save an FTA that would not be viable as an equilibrium
outcome in the absence of such exclusions. Here we will show only that, for our
example, there exist agreements with exclusions that are preferred by both governments
(considering the political pressures they face) to the status quo. We defer until next
section a discussion of the bargaining process.
The example is one that we have considered before. There are identical linear
demands in countries A and B and fixed and equal outputs in all non-numeraire sectors.
In a fraction s >1/2of these sectors country A has output OX and country B has output
(l—9)X, with 9> 1/2. The outputs are reversed in the remaining sectors. Finally, we
impose the previously described restriction 1, so that all sectors would experience
enhanced protection under an FTA. Recall that, while country B must favor the
agreement in this case, all equilibrium stances in country A reject the FTA whenthe
imbalance in the number of potential export industries is relatively large.
Let us consider a proposal to exclude from the FTA a numbereA of the sectors in
which A would import from B under an agreement without exemptions, and a number
eB of the sectors in which B would import from A, eA + eB e. How would the
politically motivated governments view such a proposal as compared with the outcome
of no FTA? We know that, if it came to a binary choice between R =Nand R =F
with the proposed exclusions, the political process would choose the latter as a coalition-
proof stance if and only if the joint welfare of the lobbies and politicians would be higher
in that regime. It is straightforward to check, using the expressions in (7) and (8),
whether that is indeed the case for countries A and B.
Under the proposed agreement, sri —eAsectors would contribute to a loss of
aggregate welfare in country A; the size of the typicalloss is given in the top row of (7).—35 —
Meanwhile,(1—s)n —eBsectors would contribute a welfare gain of equal magnitude.
These latter sectors would also generate a profit gain for specific factor owners of the
amount given in the second row of (8). The remainingeA + eB sectors would be
excluded from the FTA and so would contribute neither gains nor losses. We calculate
+ E1AH' for the proposed FTA, and find it to be positive if and only if
1
0 —1/2 aA —(28
—1+ aO)eB
+ (15)
20 —1+ 2a9 n(20 —1+ 2a0)
Suppose that eA >(20
—1+ aO)eB/aO. Then, comparing (15) with (9), we see that by
allowing exclusions we expand the range of values of s for which the FTA emerges as a
coalition-proof stance in A.At the same time, if eA <[eBa0+ (2s—1)na0 +
sn(20—1)]/(20—l+aO), then the FTA remains the coalition-proof stance in country B. So
clearly there are values of s for which the FTA without exclusions would be rejected by
country A, but where it would be possible to design an FTA with exclusions that would
be politically viable in both countries. Note in particular that if 2s —1 <em,the FTA
with eA =(2s—1)n and eB =0satisfies GATT rules and politically dominates the
status quo ante. Under such an agreement both countries have an equal number of
included import sectors, aggregate welfare in each country is the same as with no FTA,
while profit gains are realized by some industries in each country.
We have identified cases where an FTA without exclusions would fail politically,
but where some agreements with exclusions would be preferred to the status quo by
politically-motivated governments in each country. In these cases, the introduction of a
potential for exclusions will save the FTA, provided only that the governments engage
in an efficient bargaining process. Our next task is to introduce an explicit bargaining
mechanism and then ask what values of eA and eB will emerge from the negotiation.—36—
5.8 Bargaining Over Indv.stry Ezclu.sion.5
In the example we have been examining the government of country A will wanteA
to be as large as possible and eB as small as possible; each exclusion of an industry in
which A would otherwise import from B averts a potential welfare loss, while each
exclusion of an industry in which A would otherwise export to B costs the country both
a social gain and a source of new profits for the industry. Of course, the government of
country B has exactly the opposite preferences. It sees potential political gainsfrom
excluding goods that would be imported from A and by including those that would be
exported to A.
We will study the inter—governmental negotiation in two stages. First we will
simply assume that the two governments engage in an efficient bargaining process and
thereby achieve an agreement with the property that neither could gain politically
except at the expense of the other. Many but not all bargaining procedureslead to such
an efficient outcome. After we explore the Pareto frontier of the two government's
welfare, we will introduce a particular bargaining procedure and show how it pins down
the precise terms of the free trade agreement.
We retain the linear example and restriction 1. We suppose also that inequality
(9) is violated, so that the equilibrium stance in country A would favor the status quo
over an FTA without exclusions. Clearly, country B will need to grant someexclusions
to prospective import-competing industries in country A, or else the governmentof A
will refuse to enter into an agreement. In what follows we assume that the lobbies
understand and forecast the bargaining procedure at the time that they make their
offers, and also that they follow truthful strategies. In the present contextthis means
that CE =CNfor all i and j= A,B,since an industry's profits are the same when it is
excluded from an agreement as when there is no agreement at all.
The first point to notice is that no negotiated agreement will grant a positive
number of exclusions to prospective import-competing industries in countryB. That is,—37—-
eB =ofor all points on the Pareto frontier. To see this, suppose the opposite were true.
Consider a pact calling for eA > 0 and eB > o, and compare it to another with one less
exemption for each country. Aggregate welfare is the same for each country under the
alternative proposals, because each export sector generates a welfare gain that matches
the loss associated with an import sector (see (7)). Since all sectors experience enhanced
protection in our example, no specific factor owners suffer any profit loss from being
included in the agreement. So none would bid positively for an exemption. On the
other hand, the prospective exporters do gain from the liberalization of bilateral trade,
and so they are willing to pay in order to avoid the exclusion of their sector. By
reducing both eA and eB by one, the governments generate no voter hostility, but each
collects one more contribution from a potential exporter.
Now suppose that the lobbies in both countries expect eA > 0 and eB =ounder
any FTA that may materialize. Consider first the political game in country A. The
lobbies representing high-tariff industries are indifferent to the agreement, because
industry profits do not fall in the case of enhanced protection. Therefore, all these
lobbies bid nothing to block the FTA, nothing to secure an exemption for their industry,
and of course nothing to further the cause of the FTA; i.e., CE =CN=C1=0for
all i such that X =GX.On the other hand, the lobbies representing potential export
industries are keen to see the FTA go through and in particular to ensure that their
sector is included in any agreement. These lobbies set CE =CN=0,but C1 > 0.
They know that their government will accede to an agreement if and only if
> [(2s —1)n
—eAl1 —9)X2 (16)
The left—hand side of (16) represents, of course, the total contributions in support of the
agreement, while the right-hand side is a times the social cost of an FTA witheA of A's—38—
import-competing sectors excluded.20 All lobbies contribute zero if the right—handside
of (16) is negative; i.e., if the FTA with exclusions would raise national welfare.
Otherwise, if the lobbies jointly contribute enough to make the FTA fly, theywill each
reduce their contribution to the point where (16) holds as an equality. It remains to
check only that these lobbies are willing to make sufficient contributions; i.e., that each
stands to gain from the agreement at least what it is expected to pay. Each industry
with X =(1—9)Xearns extra profits of (29—1)(1—9)X2/ab under an FTA (see (8)). So
collectively their gains will be large enough to justify the requisite financial supportif
and only if eA > where
=(2s—1)n —(1—s)u(20
—l (17)
If eA ￿ there always exists at least one combination of contributions with the
property that each potential export industry contributes at most 11iF —11iNand each
one making a positive contribution is pivotal to the agreement. Thesecontributions
support a coalition-proof stance in favor of the agreement, as no lobby or groupof
lobbies has any incentive to deviate.
Now let us look at country B. There too the interest groups representing
prospective import-competing industries make zero contributions inall contingencies.
These lobbies know that their government does not intend to exdude any of B's import
sectors and, in any event, they are not harmed by the competition inthe case of
enhanced protection. Contributions come only from the potential export interests,each
one of whom seeks to avoid having its product amongthose excluded from the
agreement.Competition among the (symmetric) export lobbies drivestheir
20Thereare (1—s)n industries with X =(1—9)Xand sn —eAincluded industries with
X' =OX.The expression for the welfare effect follows from (7).—39 —
contributionsto the maximum willingness to pay; i.e., =AU=
(29—l)(1—6)X2/abfor all isuchthat X =(l—O)X.Then the government of country B
is amenable to an agreement if and only if
(20—1)(1—-O)X2 2
(sn —eA) + (2sn —n—eA)
O(1—O)X2 0 (18)
ab b
The two terms on the left-hand side of (18) are the total contributions collected from the
sn —eAexport sectors that are not excluded from the agreement and a times the net
welfare gain. Rearranging (18), we nd that for an PTA to be politically viable in
country B, the number of exclusions must not exceed eax, where
eA =(2s—1)n +
(1 —S ) n(29—1) (19) max a9+29—1
We are now ready to construct the Pareto frontier for the governments engaged in
the trade discussions. In Figure 2, the axes measure the political welfare of the two
governments. The point N represents the values attained byGA and GBno
agreement is reached. Since neither government receives any contributions toblock the
agreement, this point hasGA =aWAand GB =aWB.Next we plot the utility levels
achieved by the politicians under an PTA with different numbers of exclusions,eA. For
< the government of A rejects the agreement in spite of the bids made on its
behalf, and so the outcome remains at N. Now consider a proposal calling for slightly
more than exclusions. If lobbies in A anticipate this outcome, their contributions
would be such as to make (16) hold as an equality. That is, the government would be
left just indifferent between adopting the agreement and rejecting it. On the other
hand, the government of country B would achieve higher utility than at N, both because
aggregate welfare there would be higher under the FTA and becauseit would collect—40—
contributions from its export lobbies seeking to avoid exclusion from the agreement.
The left-hand side of (18) gives the gain to the government of country B from an FTA
with eA exclusions, relative to the outcome at point N. The different values ofeA E
(2s—1)n] trace out the different points along the segment AB in the figure.
An FTA with eA =(2s—l)nexclusions leaves aggregate welfare unchanged in
country A, and so the lobbies there need not contribute anything toinduce their
government to accept such an agreement. The government of A still attainsthe same
level of political welfare as when it rejects the agreement. But foreA >(2s—1)n,
aggregate welfare in A is higher with the PTA than without it, and sothe government's
political welfare rises above the level at N, even though all campaign contributions inA
are zero (see (16)). Provided thateA < the government of B also achieves higher
political welfare than at N. The points along BC in the figure correspond tonumbers of
exclusions in the range [(2s—1)n, Finally, for eA > the government of B
rejects the agreement, and political outcome again is at N. Thus,ABC represents the
Pareto frontier for the two negotiating parties, and an efficient agreement leads to a
number of exclusions between and
At last we are ready to illustrate how a particular bargaining procedure could be
used to pin down the terms of the agreement. Suppose that the governmentsmake
alternating offers.2' Each government in its turn names a numberof exclusions, eA. If
the other accepts the offer, the bargaining ends. But if the other rejects the offer,the
negotiations break down with some exogenous probability.If they do not break down,
the second government gets a chance to make a counter-offer. The procedurecontinues
until an agreement is reached, or until the negotiations collapse, lithe negotiations
collapse, the status quo situation continues indefinitely.
It is clear that, with this procedu.re, the equilibrium outcome must occur
21 This is a modified version of the Rubinstein (1982) model, as described by Binmore et
al. (1986) and Sutton (1986).—41 —
somewherealong BC in Figure 2. The government of A would never accept any
proposal offering fewer than (2s—1)n, because lobbies anticipating such an outcome
would have offered contributions that just leave the politicians indifferent between
accepting the proposal and allowing the talks to end. In the event, the government of A
would always choose to make a counteroffer, even at the risk of a breakdown in the
talks. In our example, it is the country with the larger number of high-tariff industries
that realizes welfare gains from the equilibrium FTA, while the other country's
government trades off these gains for the political support it can amass from its eager
potential exporters.22
The exact point of the equilibrium can be found by the method described in
Grossman and Helpman (1993). In particular, the government making the first offer
chooses one that leaves the other just indifferent between accepting and rejecting, in
view of the positive probability of breakdown in the event of rejection but also the
opportunity that rejection affords the other to design a more favorable counterproposal.
The second government's counteroffer has the similar property that it leaves the first
indifferent between accepting and rejecting.From these two equations we can
determine the offer and counteroffer, which depend on the two governments' discount
rates and their welfare under the status quo. Each government obtains an agreement
more favorable to itself the lower is its discount rate relative to that of its opposite, and
the higher is its country's aggregate welfare in the status quo ante.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the conditions under which a free trade agreement might
22Wenote that, in our example, all potential agreements leave aggregate world welfare at
the same level as without the FTA. Therefore, at most one country can benefit in
welfare terms from any agreement. In other circumstances the equilibrium outcome
might entail gains (or losses) for the average voter in both countries.—42 —
emergeas an equilibrium outcome of a negotiation between politically—minded
governments. The governments, we imagine, respond to political pressuresfrom
industry special interests, but also pay some heed to the plightof the average voter.
If an FTA must completely liberalize trade among the partner countries, then a
particular government might endorse the agreement in two typesof situations. The first
arises when the agreement would generate substantial welfare gains for the average voter
and adversely affected interest groups fail to achieve even minimal coordinationin their
efforts to block the accord. The second arises when the agreement would create profit
gains for potential exporters to the partner country in excessof the losses that would be
suffered by import-competing industries plus the political cost of anywelfare harm that
the agreement might inflict on the average voter.
A free trade agreement requires the assent of both governments. We havefound
that this outcome is most likely when there is relative balance in the potentialtrade
between the partner countries and when the agreement affordsenhanced protection
rather than reduced protection to most sectors. With enhanced protection, an exporting
industry captures the benefits of the high domestic pricesin the partner country. With
reduced protection, an import—competing industry sees its domestic pricefall as a result
of the duty—free imports from the partner. Whereas reduced protection mayinvolve
some trade creation, enhanced protection gives rise only totrade diversion. Thus, the
conditions that enhance the viability of a potential agreement alsoraise the likelihood
that the agreement would reduce aggregate social welfare.
If some industries can be excluded from an FTA, or can at least be granted long
periods of adjustment, then the political prospectsfor an agreement improve. Each
government would wish to exclude from an agreementthose sectors whose inclusion
would impose on it the greatest political costs. Political costsreflect either the fierce
opposition of the import-competing interests or theharm that would be suffered by the
average voter in the face of inefficienttrade diversion. By excluding some sensitive—43—
sectors, a government may be able to diffuse the opposition to an FTA. In a bargaining
situation, exclusions will tend to be concentrated in the country that otherwise would
block the accord.
Our formal analysis of bargaining over industry exclusions focused on a case with
only two types of industries in each country. Industries were categorized either as
potential exporters or potential import-competitors, with symmetry within each of these
groups. It is straightforward to extend the analysis to allow for more asymmetry. Then
efficient bargaining would cause exclusions to be granted on the basis of comparative
political advantage; that is, industries would be ranked on the basis of the political cost
from inclusion to the government of the import-competing country in relation to the
political benefit to the government of the exporting country.
We conducted all of our analysis under the restrictive (but somewhat realistic)
assumption that governments cannot offer direct, treasury-to-treasury, transfer
payments as compensation for any political costs associated with an agreement.It
would be a simple matter to redo our analysis for the case where such transfers are
feasible.The more interesting and difficult question in the political economy of
international relations concerns the reasons why compensation payments have played
such a limited role in most trade negotiations.—44 —
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Appendix
roof of Restdt 5
Let the C referred to in result 5 be given by
=
iEE(e)
[0, a(W1F— WiN) + J
where 1
jE(e)
[max (0, jN jF + aWJN —aWp)].
Sufficiency
We establish first that an unpressured stance in support of an FTA exists under
the stated conditions, with the set of excluded sectors 5(e). Let CjN =C0 for all i,
Cj5 =max[0, a(W1F —W1N)+ J] for iEE(e), and Cj5 =max(0, iN —fljp)for
iE(e). Then C =SC15. It follows from (14) that withthese contributions the
iEE(e)
government prefers F with the excluded sectors E(e) to N, and also to anyFTA with a
different set of excluded sectors. We must show that, with these contribution offers, no
lobby has any incentive to deviate.
(a) Consider an industry iØE(e). This industry is included in the FTA,and therefore
contributes nothing to the government.Its net profit equals fl. In order to be
excluded from F the industry would have to raise its offer CiE above 11iN 11jwhich
would reduce its profits net of contributions. This industry might also raise its offer
CiN, in order to induce the government to rejectthe FTA entirely. But this too would
be unprofitable, in view of (14). Finally, the lobby cannot gain by reducing Cj5 in case
it is positive, because the contribution is not paid in any event.
(b) Now consider an industry iEE(e). The definition of 5(e) implies that,for this
industry, 0 CiE max (0,fliN_lljF). The lobby has no incentive toraise CjN in order—46 —
toinduce the government to reject the agreement, and no incentive to raise C11. Also, it
has no incentive to raise CjE, because the proposed contribution is large enough to
ensure the industry a place on the list of excluded sectors. If CjE =0,the lobby cannot
reduce this bid any further. So we need only check that the industry has no incentive to
reduce its bid CjE when this offer happens to be positive.
There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that #E(e) < e. Then J =0.In
the event, if lobby i were to reduce its bid below CjE =max[0, a(WF— wiN)], the
government would remove industry i from the list of exclusions. Second, supposethat
#E(e) =e.Then J > 0. If lobby i were to reduce its bid below CLE =max[0,
a(WF— wiN) + JJ, the government would gain by replacingi by jonthe list of
excluded sectors, where jargmax [max (0, + aW.N —aW.F)1.In either
jE(e)
case the net profits of lobby i will not rise, since the definition of E(e) ensuresthat
0 ￿C1 ￿ max (0, 11iN —F)for all i EE(e).It follows that i cannot profitably deviate.
Necessity
Now suppose that (14) is violated, but that the government nonetheless chooses F
with some set of exclusions E(e) such that #E(e)e. There are two cases to consider.
(a) Suppose E(e) E(e). If E(e) c E(e) then #E(e)<e, and there exists an iEE(e)that
is not in E(e).It follows from the definition of E(e) that for this i, iF1iN +
a(WF_WIN)> 0. Since the government has chosen toexclude i from the agreement, it
must be that C— C11+ a(WN_WF) ￿ 0.Together these inequalities imply
HiN_CiE < 11jF1I It follows that lobbyi would prefer not to be excluded from the
FTA. By choosing CjE= 0 and C11 slightly below '1iF11iN' the industry caninduce
the government to drop it from the list of exclusions, in view ofthe fact that
lllF_flN+a(WF_WN)> 0. This contradictsthe supposition that F with exclusions
E(e) is a unilateral stance. On the other hand, if E(e) is not a subset of E(e),then there— 47—
existsan industry iEE(e) that is not excluded from the agreement and an industry
iEE(e) that is not in E(e). By the definition of E(e) industry i can raise its CjE to
slightly below iNiF' and thereby ensure itself a place on the list of exclusions
instead of industry i. Since this deviation would increase its net profits, there can be no
unpressured stance with R=F and E(e) # E(e).
(b) E(e) =E(e).Since the government chooses R=F with the set of excluded sectors
E(e) and C1=O for all included sectors in an unpressured stance, it follows that





(14) is violated implies that
max [0 ,max(11iN —1'iF1— C > C —SCiE. (Al)
i$E(e) i iEE(e)
For lobby jE(e), CjE ￿ max (0, jN —F)'
because we have ruled out weakly
dominated strategies. Therefore, lobby i E E(e) would never bid more than CiE =
max[0, a(WIF —WIN)+ 3], because such a bid would ensure it a place on the list of
excluded sectors, and a still higher can be profitably reduced. It follows that the right-
hand side of (Al) is non-negative, and therefore that
max [0 'iE(e) —11iF)]> CjN. (A2)
Inequality (A2) ensures the existence of a lobby jE(e) that could raise its contribution
CiN toslightly below max [0 'ie)N —11iF)]'so that: (a) 11jN —
CJN> 11jF'
and (b) if jreplacesCiN with CiN and the other lobbiesdo not change their
contributions, the government prefers N to F with exclusions E(e). This contradicts the
supposition that F is an unpressured stance.
It follows that (14) is necessary for the existence of an anpressured stance.— 48—
Table1
Outcomes Under an FTA (ri>r?)
Enhanced Intermediate Reduced
Protection ProtectiQn
A imports from R.O.W.? yes no no
B consumes own output? no no yes
ProducerpriceinA B






























atC A= e max